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The key to sustained  recovery  in developing  countries is the
revival of private investment. This revival requires  a coordi-
nated set of credible  policies  - fiscal,  exchange  rate, tax, and
public expenditure  restructuring. In several  countries  the debt
overhang  is also an obstacle  to achieving  that credibility.
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The importance of private domestic investment  alternative ways of financing it affect private
in growth and development strategies is impor-  investment? How do these options affect the real
tant in the transition to the 1990s. In most  interest rate, credit allocation, and the real
developing countries in the 1980s, domestic  exchange rate, and how do those variables affect
investment bore the brunt of the total contraction  private investment?  How does public spending
in demand associated with extemal adjustment.  affect private investment decisions?  What effect
does inflation have when there is no fuUy
Increasingly there is agreement about the  indexed tax system?
desirability of increasing the private sector's
share in total capital fomiation by relying more  Chhibber and Dailami conclude that most
on market forces and incentives.  It is now  developing countries have restricted access to
widely accepted that expansion of private  foreign financing so there is direct competition
investment should be the main impetus for  between the public and private sectors for
economic growth, and that public investment  limited financial resources.  Big fiscal deficits
resources should graduaUy focus on social areas,  preempt funds and restrict private investors'
including the alleviation of poverty and the  access to them.  But spending cuts must be
upgrading of social capital and services.  Invest-  structured to protect and even expand public
ment opportunities have improved in the indus-  investments that help private sector investment
trial countries so it is foolish to assume any  and - more important - to avoid physically
favorable response by foreign investors to  crowding private firms out from product and
investments in developing countries without a  factor markets.
strong commitment by indigenous private
investors.  With reduced fiscal deficits and fnancial
liberalization, market forces will play more of a
Chhibber and Dailami investigate several  role in the volume and allocation of private
questions in connection with fiscal policy, its  investment.  Tax policy wil be increasingly
connections with the pace of private domestic  important in influencing market investment
investment and its role in the adjustment pro-  decisions.  This requires a better understanding
grams of developing countries:  How do choices  of various institutional, financial, and tax factors
between alternative sources of deficit fnancing  that have led to so much corporate indebtedness
affect private investment? How does private  in developing countries.
investment in developing countries respond, for
instance, to devaluation of the exchange rate?  Chhibber and Dailami highlight the main
To what extent does public investment comple-  elements of these factors that must be incorpo-
ment private investment and to what extent does  rated in determening the cost of capital to firms
it crowd it out in the competition for resources?  and the after-tax rate of return to investors.
How does the size of the fiscal deficit and
The PRE  Working  Paper  Series  dissemmnates  the findings  of work  under  way in dhe  Bank's  Policy,  Research,  and Extenal
Affairs  Complex.  Anobjectiveof  theseries  is to  getthesefmdings  outquickly,  even  if presentations  are  less  than  fully  polished.
The  fmidings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
Produced  by the PRE  Dissemination  CenterFISCAL  POLICY  AND PRIVATE  INVESTMENT  IN DEVELOPING  COUNTRIESs
Recent  Evidence  on Key  Selected  Issues
by  Ajay  Chhibber  and  Mansoor  Dailami
1.  INTRODUCTION
The importance  of private domestic  investment  to the growth and
development  strategy  of developing  countries  in  the  transition  to the  1990s  is
emerging  with  particular  clarity  from  the  convergence  of  two  strands  of  empirical
and  policy  concerns. One is the  evidence  that in almost  all these  countries,
over  the  past  decade,  domestic  investment  has  borne  the  brunt  of the  aggregate
demand  contraction  associated  with  the  process  of  external  adjustment. (Figure
1 and  Tab:.e  1)  The  second,  which  derives  partly  from  the  first,  is the  growing
agreement  on the  desirability  of increasing  the  private  sector's  share  in  total
capital  formation  through  increased  reliance  on market  forces  and incentives.
Accordingly,  it is now widely accepted  that expansion  of private  investment
should  be the main impetus  for economic  growth, allowing  public investment
resources  gradually  to focus  on social  areas,  including  alleviation  of poverty
and  the  upgrading  of social  capital  and  services.
The  logic  of  this  new  strategy  is  straightforward:  enduring  adjustment
to the changed  global  environment  of the 1980s  can  take place  only through  a
balanced  and vigorous  resumption  of private investment  that leads to higher
efficiency  of  resource  use  and  serves  as  a  positive  signal  to foreign  investors.
Private  domestic  investment  in  developing  countries  needs  to  be seen  not  only  as
a contributor  to economic  growth  and employment  generation,  but also as a
catalyst  to attract  foreign  direct  capital. It seems  reasonable  to argue  that
the  opportunity  cost  of investing  in  developing  countries  has  increased  because
of improved  investment  opportunities  in  the  industrial  countries  in  response  to
ir.creases  in  business  profitability  and  to the momentum created  by the  move2
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Source: World Bank,  International  Economics  Department.3
Table  lt  Public  and  Private  Investment  for  a  Group  of
29  Developing  Countries,  1970-88
(percentage  of GDP  at current  prices)
Group  1970-80  1981-82  1983-84  1985-88
29 Countries
Total  20.3  22.2  18.8  17.6
Private  12.2  11.7  9.7  9.6
Public  8.2  10.5  9.0  8.0
13 Highly  indebted  countries
Total  20.1  20.2  15.1  15.2
Private  12.3  10.9  8.1  8.7
Public  7.8  9.2  7.0  6.5
Sample:  Aigentina ,*Bangladesh,  Bolivia ,  Brazil ,  Chile ,  Colombia*,
Costa  Rica ,  Ecuador  ,  Gualemala,  Hungary,  India,  Indonesla,  Kenya,  Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico ,  Nigeria ,  Pakistan, Peru , *Philippines ,  Portugal,
Sri  Lanka,  Thailand,  Tunisia,  Turkey,  Uruguay  ,  Venezuela,  Zambia,  Zi-mbabwe.
*  Highly  Indebted  Countries.
Source: Serven  and  Solimano  (1990).
toward  a  united  Europe  and  the  liberalization  of  Eastern  European  economies. In
the  absence  of  a  strong  commitment  by indigenous  private  investors,  it  would  seem
foolishly  optimistic  to  assume  any favorable  response  by foreign  investors.
Within  this  overall  perspective,  three  sets  of  questions  about  the  pace
of private  domestic  investment,  its prospects  for recovery,  and its role in
adjustment  programs  of  developing  countries,  emerge  as  a  chief  concern  of  fiscal
policy,  both  a,  the  national  and  international  level.  First  is  the  relationship
between  stabilization  measures  affected  through  aggregate  demand  management  and
the  need  for  investment  recovery.  To  the  extent  that  control  of  aggregate  demand
for stabilization  purposes  entails  in most developing  countries  reliance  on4
exchange  rate  devaluation,  higher  domestic  interest  rates,  and  a  mix of fiscal
and  credit  contraction,  the  responsiveness  of  private  investment  to such  policy
changes  assumes considerable  importance.  How do choices  between alternate
sour^es  of deficit financing  affect private investment?  How does private
investment  in  developing  countries  respond,  for  instance,  to  a  devaluation  of  the
exchange  rate? There  are  clearly  both  short-run  and  long-run  effects,  and  these
effects  could  operate  in  opposite  directions.
Besides  these  intertemporal  trade-offs  inherent  in  investment  responses
to  exchange rate  and  interest rate  changes, there  are  the  important
considerations  of  policy  credibility,  and  governments'  commitment  to a  path  of
prudent  and  stable  policy  that  bear  strongly  on  businesses'  investment  decisions.
A firm commitment  to stabilization  measures  and policy  reform,  even at some
short-term  costs  of lost  output,  is likely  to be more critical  in influencing
long-term  investment  decisions  than  policy  fluctuations  and  stop-go  strategies.
There  is  now  discernible  evidence  that  countries  which  have  demonstrated  their
willingness  and ability  to stay  the course  have begun to show resumption  in
growth. However,  the debt overhang  remains  a shroud  and a reminder  of past
mistakes  clouding  future  recovery  in  many  countries.
The  second  aspect  of  the  relationship  between  fiscal  policy  and  private
investment  relates  to the complementarity  or competitiveness  of private and
public  investment.  To the  extent  that  public  investment  expenditures  result  in
the provision  of public  servi.es  which reduce  the cost of production  of the
private sector, they have h  positive effect on private profitability  and
investment. Higher aggregate  public  investment  expenditures  can also raise
demand  and  increase  capacity  utilization  in  the  private  sector. On the  negative
side,  public  investment  expenditures  can  crowd  out  the  private  sector  in input5
and product  markets, or in financial  markets.  Given the relatively  high
dependence  of business  enterprises  in developing  countries  on debt capital,
particularly  bank loans  to finance  their  investment  and  growth,  the  specter  of
'financial  crowding  out'  is  rather  serious. Private  sector  companies  are  prone
to face  much more stringent  credit  supply  constraints  from  the  banking  sector
than their  public sector  counterparts. Besides,  private  companies  are also
excluded  from the resources  of non-banking  financial  institutions,  such as
insurance  and  pension  fund  companies. Access  to these  resources  are reserved
exclusively  for  public  sector  companies  and  often  at subsidized  -ates.
The  third  question  relating  to the  relationship  between  fiscal  policy
and  private  investment  concerns  the  role  of  capital  income  taxation  as  a  tool  in
influencing  investment  incentives.  Dependence  on tax policy to influence
investment  spending  has  been  a  permanent  feature  of  pTbl"c  policy  in  the  market
economy of the  industrial  countries,  but has not  figured prominently  in
developing  countries'  programs  of investment  control. The reasons  for  such  a
reluctance  on the  part of policymakers  in developing  countries  to rely  on tax
policy  are  not  difficult  to find. First  is  the  combination  of  institutional  and
conceptual  factors,  including  the  sheer  weight  of the  government  sector  itself
in  the  process  of  capital  formation,  the  close  budgetary  link  between  the  central
government  and public enterprise  companies,  the weakness ir.  the accounting,
enforcement  and  administrative  procedures.  Second  is  the  complexity  of  measuring
capital  income,  particularly  in inflationary  environments. Nevertheless,  the
shift  in  economic  strategy  from  the  past  method  of  direct  government  intervention
to  a  new  strategy,  dependent  on  policy-induced  incentives,  is  currently  a focus
of liberalization  and  privatization  measures  underway  in developing  countries.6
A well-designed corporate tax s'stem is an integral ingredient of such a new
strategy.
Analysis  of  private  investment  behavior  is  difficult  and  controversial,
even in the context  of developed  countries  with more stable  institutions  and
policy  regimes.  The  controversy  among  various  approaches  to  the  determinants  of
private  investment  in  industrial  countries,  which  has  persisted  in  the  economic
literature  over  the  past  fifty  years,  is  one  manifestation  of the  intractability
of assessing  how investors  respond  to changes  in the underlying  economic  and
financial  environment  [see for instance,  Abel (1980)  and Shaplra (1986)  for
further  discussion]. In the  last  decade,  however,  there  has  been  much  work on
the determinants  of private  investment  in developing  countries.  This paper
addresses  the  questions  outlined  above  and  surveys  the  recent  theoretical  as  well
as  empirical  literature  on  these  three  key  issues. In  doing  so,  the  paper  hopes
to assess  the role of private  investment  in current  debate  on adjustment  and
growth  strategies  in  developing  countries.
The  remainder  of  the  paper  proceeds  as follows.  Section  2  examines  the
effect  of  the  size  of  the  fiscal  deficit  and  alternative  sources  of  financing  the
budget  deficit  on  private  investment.  The  key  issues  here  are  how  these  options
affect  the  real  interest  rate,  credit  allocation  and  the  real  exchange  rate  and
how  those  variables  in  turn  affect  private  investment?  In Section  3  we turn  to
the  impact  of  public  expenditure  decisions  on  private  investment.  In  particular
we look at different  types  of public  investment  choices  and their impact  on
private investment  and  survey  both the theoretical  as well  as empirical
literature  on the  subject. In Sections  4 and  5  we examine  the  implications  of
tax  policy  for  private  investment  decisions. Section  4  examines  the  effect  of
tax  policy  on  private  investment  in  the  presence  of  capital  market  imperfections7
whereas  Section  5 discusses  the  impact  of inflation  in the  absence  of a fully
indexed  tax  system. The  final  section  provides  some  concluding  thoughts.
2.  FISCAL  DEFICITS,  STABILIZATION  AND  PRIVATE  INVESTMENT
The  relationship  between  fiscal  deficits  and  private  investments  must
be examined  in a  macroeconomic  framework. In order  to place  this  section  in  a
coherent  context  we begin  in  Section  2.1  by  asking  how  fiscal  policy  affects  real
interest  rates  and  credit  allocation  which  affect  private  investment.  We then
turn  in  Section  2.2  to  the  econometric  evidence  on  the  relationship  between  real
interest  rate/credit  allocation,l  and private  investment. In Section  2.3  we
examine  the  nature  of fiscal  adjustment  in  the  1980s  and  how it  affected  private
investment.  In Section  2.4  we analyze  the  links  from  fiscal  deficit  to  private
investment  through  the  real  exchange  rate.
2.1  Fiscal  Deficits,  Interest  Rates  and  Credit  Allocation 2
The  impact  of fiscal  deficits  on private  investment  is  best  understood
by beginning  with the  familiar  national  income  identity:
G - T  - (Sp  - Ip)  +  (M - X)  (1)
fiscal  net private  foreign
deficit  savings  savings
At a very simple  level,  one can see that an increase  in  he fiscal
deficit  (G - T) without  recourse  to increased  foreign  borrowing  (H - X) must
imply  an increase  in  net  private  savings  --  an increase  in  private  savings  or a
decline  in private  investment  or a combination.  How  much of the  adjustment  is
borne  by private  investment  depends  on how fiscal  deficits  affect  the  cost  and8
availability  of credit.  It is necessar:'  to distinguish  between  economies  in
which  interest  rates  are  uncontrolled  versus  those  where  credit  is  allocated  by
non-price  mechanisms.
If interest  rates  are controlled  and credit  is allocated,  there  is a
one-to-one  negative  correspondence  between  higher  credit  to  the  public  sector  to
finance  the  fiscal  deficit  and  reduced  credit  for  the  private  sector. If  instead
the  government  increases  expenditure  and  resorts  to  monetary  financing,  the  story
is  a little  more  complicated.  Monetary  financing  leads  to  a  rise  in  the  rate  of
inflation. Since  nominal  interest  rates  are fixed,  real interest  rates  fall.
If private savings fall as a  result of lower real interest rates, 3 the
availability  of  loanable  funds  to  the  private  sector  declines  even  further.  The
credit  squeeze  on the private sector  is to that extent  greater.  A further
complication  is  introduced  by the  possibility  of  the  Tanzi-effect  (Tanzi,  1977)
with a reduction  in tax revenues  due to higher  inflation,  leading  to larger
deficit  financing  requirements. In any case, irrespective  of the financing
option  chosen  a  higher  fiscal  deficit  with  repressed  financial  markets  will lead
to a reduction  in credit  to the  private  sector.
When interest  rates  are  market  determined,  the effects  are somewhat
different. If the  financing  is  done  through  domestic  borrowing  either  through
the  commercial  banks  or  through  direct  borrowing  from  the  non-bank  private  sector
interest  rates  rise. 4 This  will also involve  the complication  of increasing
government  interest  payments  on short-term  debt  held  by the  government.  On the
positive  side,  with  higher  real  interst  rates,  the  demand  for  money  rises  so  that
the  same  level  of inflation  tax  revenue  is  available  at a  lower  inflation  rate.
If  higher  interest  rates  lead  to  more  private  savings  the  extent  of  the  increase
in interest  rates  is contained  to some  extent.9
Recourse  to monetary  financing  instead  of domestic  borrowing,  with
uncontrolled  interest  rates raises  both the rate of inflation  and the real
interest  rate. The real  interest  rate  rises  because  the  higher  inflation  rate
raises  the  tax  on financial  intermediation  through  the  reserve  requirement.  So
irrespective  of  the  method  of  financing  a  larger  fiscal  defi._it  with  uncontrolled
interest  rates  will always  lead  to  higher  real  interest  rates.
Let  us turn  next to the  empirical  evidence  in  developing  countries  on
the  effects  of real  interest  rates  and  cred.t  allocation  on private  investment.
2.2  Real Interest  Rates,  Credit  Allocation  and  Private  Investment
The  underlying  logic  of a negative  relationship  between  real  interest
rates and private investment  is fairly  well establisbed.  However, until
recently,  most empirical  studies  of private investment  did not show direct
evidence  of this relationship. Instead,  these studies  reflected  underlying
conditions  of credit  and interest  rate regulations  in financial  markets in
developing  countries. With controlled  interest  rates  and financial  repression
the availability  of  credit becomes the relevant constraining  variables. 5
Accordingly  several  empirical  studies  have established  a significant  positive
relationship  between  the  availability  of  credit  to  the  private  sector  and  private
investment.
Blejer  and  Khan  (1984)  using  data  for  24  devtiLoping  countries  have  shown
a positive  significant  relationship  between  the  change  in real  bank  credit  and
real  net  private  capital  flows  to  the  private  sector  and  private  investment.  Fry
(1980)  using  data  over  61 countries  for  the  period  1961-75  also finds  somewhat
similar  results. More  recently  Sharrif  (1990)  has  shown  a significant  positive
relationship  between  credit  to the  private  sector  and  private  investment.6 At10
a  micro-level  Tybout  (1984),  using  data  on  manufacturing  firms  in  Colombia  from
the annual  census  of manufacturing  for  the  years  1973-76  estab)'shes  the fact
that  investor  behavior  differs  substantially  across  credit  access  groups. These
studies  establish  a  fairly  robust  conclusion  that  during  financial  repression  the
availability  of  credit  allocation  to  the  private  sector  had  a  significant  effect
on  private  investment. 7
More recent  evidence  using  data from  countries  which  have undergone
financial  liberalization  shows  that the real  cost of credit,  rather  than the
quantity  of  credit  is  a  significant  explanatory  variable.  Using  Indonesian  data
for the period  1970-88 (Chhibber  and Shafik (1990)]  show a very significant
negative  relationship.  In the  case  of  Mexico  also  van  Wijnbergen  (1989)  using
time  series  data  from  1970-88  shows  a significant  negative  relationship  between
real  lending  rates  and  private  investment.  Greene  and  Villanueva  (1990)  using
cross-country  data  over  23  developing  countries  rur  the  period  1975-87  also  find
significant  negative  effects  of  real  interest  rates  on  private  investment  rates.
In sonme  studies  both the quantity  and the cost of credit  have been
included  in the estimation  of private  investment. One could argue for the
inclusion  of both a real interest  rate (appropriately  defined)  and a credit
allocation  term  in  the  private  investment  equation  for  several  reasons. First,
a number  of economies  are  undergoing  financial  liberalization  and  decontrol  of
interest  rates. So  there  is  a  regime  shift  with  a  part  of the  data  from  a  period
of financial  repression  and  the  remainder  after  liberalization.  Second,  during
periods  of financial  repression  commercial  banks  cannot  change  interest  rates.
However, they can alter the real effective lending rate through various
mechanisms  such  as compensating  balances. 8 It is these  rates  that should  be
included  in empirical  estimation. Third,  even  after  interest  rates  have been11
decontrolled  commercial  banks  may  not  be  able  to  distinguish  between  low  and  high
risk  borrowers. As a result  some  borrowers  are  likely  to  be rationed  (Stiglitz
and  Weiss  (1981)]  and  Blinder  and  Stiglitz  (1983)].  The  rationing  increases  when
high  fiscal  deficits  impose  heavy  borrowing  requirements  on financial  markets.
An  interesting  case is that of Turkey,  where financial  markets  were
liberalized  in  1983. In  analyzing  the  Turkish  private  investment  behavior  using
data  for  1970-87  Chhibber  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1989)  allow  for  these  effects  by
including  both  a private  credit  and a real lending  rate  variable  in a private
investment  function.  The  real  effective  lending  rate  in  their  study  includes  the
cost of compensating  balances to the borrower. 9 Moreover, post-financial
liberalization  Turkey  was characterized  by persistently  heavy public sector
borrowing  in  domestic  financial  markets,  high  real  interest  rates  and  threatened
bankruptcies.  These  were  conditions  under  which  the  Blinder  and  Stiglitz  model
of  credit  rationing  would  hold  even  though  interest  rates  had  been  decontrolled.
In their study both the quantity  of credit to the private sector  and real
effective  lending  had a significant  effect  on private  investment.
The  outcome  of this  empirical  survey  is  that  both  the  costs  of credit
as  well  as  the  quantity  affect  private  investment  in  developing  countries.  Their
relative  importance  varies,  depending  on  the  degree  of  financial  liberalization.
In  economies  with repressed  financial  systems  it  is  the  quantity  of credit  that
affects  private  investment  whereas  in  economies  where  financial  markets  have  been
deregulated  the  real  lending  rate  is the  relevant  variable. Let  us now relate
this  to  fiscal  policy  and  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  fiscal  adjustment  that  took
place  in  the  1980s.12
2.3  Fiscal  Adlustment  in the  19809  and  Private  Investment
In Section  2.1  we established  that  domestic  financing  of the  deficit
imposed  constraints  on the availability/cost  of credit  to the private  sector
irrespective  of the degree  of financial  liberalization,  and irrespective  of
whether  the  financing  option  was  borrowing  or  money  creation.  Section  2.2  showed
the significance  of credit  to the  private  sector  as a determinant  of private
investment. In this  section  we ask  ihat  the  experience  was in  the 1980s. Can
we attribute  some of the decline  in private  investment  to persistently  high
fiscal  deficits?
Figure  2 presents  evidence  on the  extent  of adjustment  in the fiscal
deficit  and the current  account  in 33 developing  countries  during  the  period
1980-88.  The shaded  gap shows the net private savings  requirements  of the
private sector (or roughly  the domestic  financing  of the public sector),1°
resulting  in  reduced  availability  of  credit  to  the  private  sector. The  stylised
facts  that  emerge  from  this  evidence  are  that 'during  the  1980s  fiscal  deficits
did  not  match  the  cuts  in  the  current  account  deficit. Countries  were  forced  to
cut the current  account deficit  because foreign  financing  was unavailable.
However,  a large  number  of countries  were  unable  to  bring  about  the  same  degree
of cuts  in the  fiscal  deficit. As a result,  a larger  proportion  of the  fiscal
deficit  was financed  domestically;  either  through  borrowing  or money  creation.
We saw from  earlier  sections  that in either  case the final  outcome  of higher
domestic  financing  would have implied  reduced  availability  of credit  to the
private  sector.
This story is corroborated  by looking  at the consolidated  financial
accounts. These  accounts  show the  growth  of real  domestic  credit  by country
classified  by  the  public  and  the  private  sector  and  supports  the  central  role  of13
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excessive  fiscal  deficits  precipitating  a  crisis  in  many  countries  and  sustaining
it.  Chhibber  and  Khalilzadeh-Shirazi  (1988)  and  Easterly  (1989)  show  evidence
that countries  such  as Korea,  Indonesia,  Colombia,  Thailand  and Turkey  which
keptfiscal  deficits  in check,  and curtailed  the flow of credit  to the  public
sector  and  to  public  enterprises  did  not  get  into  difficulties.  These  countries
were also able to continue  positive  and  uninterrupted  flow of credit  to the
private  sector. This  was  crucial  in  maintaining  private  investment  and  growth.
On  the  other  hand  in  the  so-called  crises  countries  there  were  negative  net  flows
of credit  from  the  financial  system  to  the  private  sector. These  were  countries
where  private  investment  fell  sharply. 11
2.4  Fiscal  Deficits,  Exchange  Rates  and  Private  Investment
The effect  of fiscal  deficits  through  financial  markets on private
investment  tells  only  one  part of the story,  albeit  a very important  one.  A
related  affect  which  we ignored  in the  previous  section  is the  effect  through
exchange  rates. We take  up this  issue  here  briefly. The  central  link  is that
high  fiscal  deficits  and  an appreciated  exchange  rate  can  be  maintained  as long
as  foreign  financing  is  available.  However,  once  foreign  financing  is  curtailed
there  is  pressure  to  devalue.  Acceleration  of  inflation  leads  to  an  appreciation
of the real exchange  rate.  External  balance is maintained  through import
controls  and/or  exchange  controls.  Export  industries  are  adversely  affected  and
import  competing  industries  are protected.  At some stage  the government  is
forced  to devalue.
A devaluation  affects  private  investment  through  several  channels. 12
Firstly,  a  devaluation  alters  t-.e  real  supply  price  of  capital  goods. Secondly,
it  affects  the  real  price  of imported  inputs  which  are  used  in conjunction  with15
capital  goods  to produce  output. Thirdly,  a devaluation  has an impact  on the
real  product  wage and  thereby  affects  profitability  and  investment. Fourthly,
a devaluation  produces  changes  in real income  which affects the demand for
domestically  produced  goods. Finally,  a devaluation  affects  nominal  and  real
interest  rates  which in turn  have an impact  on investment. The  net effect  of
devaluation  on investment  will therefore  be a composite  of several  factors  and
is theoretically  indeterminate.
The  short  and  long  run  effects  of a devaluation  on private  investment
can go in opposing  directions. Even if the short run effects  are negative
because  of increases  in the  real  cost  of imported  capital  and inputs,  the  long
run  effects  may still  be positive. The increase  in exports  and  growth  due  to
devaluation  could  result in higher private investment.  Therefore, the
information  on  the  short  versus  long  run  effects  of  a  devaluation  is  critical  in
the  design  of fiscal  stabilization  programs  and  in  particular  in assessing  the
size  of external  assistance  required  for  their  successful  implementation.  The
short  run  negative  effects  appear  'Largely  due  to  the  contractionary  demand  effect
of a  devaluation  and  to the  higher  costs  of imported  inputs  into  production.  13
However, as  the  economy responds through higher  exports to  increased
competitiveness,  the  long  run  effects  on  private  investment  can  be significantly
favorable.
It is  necessary  to  view  the  effect  of  devaluation  on  private  investment
in  a  macroeconomic  context.  If  a  devaluation  is  to  achieve  its  primary  objective
of improving  the trade imbalance  then,  for a given  level  of output,  domestic
demand  must fall:
Y = Cp +  Ip +  Cg +  Ig +  (X - M).  (2)16
For  f.'xed  output  levels  (Y)  an increase  in  private  investment  (Ip)  is
possible  only  if  public  expenditures  (Cg  - Ig)  fall  by  more  than  the  improvement
in the trade imbalance (X-M). 14 If aggregate  output  falls, the short run
effect  on  private  investment  is  likely  to  be  negative.  On the  other  hand,  if  the
effect  on  output  of  a  devaluation  is  positive  due  to  a strong  and  rapid  response
from  the  tradable  goods  sectors,  these  negative  effects  can  be avoided. Even  if
these  positive  effects  are  not large  enough  in  the short  run  because  of a  weak
supply  response,  the  long-run  effects  need  not be.  How quickly  would a turn-
around  take  place  and  under  what conditions  would it come about?  These  would
naturally  vary  from  one  country  to  another.  Two  recent  papers  by  Solimano  (1990)
and  by  Chhibber  and  Shafik  (1990)  address  this  issue. Both  papers  show  that  the
long-run  benefits  of  devaluation  far  outweigh  the  short-run  contractionary  costs.
The  paper  by Solimano  (1990)  on  Chile  uses  a three-equation  model  to
simultaneously  determine  the  level  of private  investment,  the  profitability  of
investment  (measured  by Tobin's  q) and  the  level  of output. The  real  exchange
rate  affects  the  level  of profitability  as  well  as the  level  of  output  which is
demand  determined.  Real  private  investment  fell  sharply  in  Chile  in  1982-83  and
took about 4 years to recover.  The large devaluation  in 1982-84  hurt the
profitability  of investment  through  an increase  in the replacement  price of
capital. But over time the  profitability  of the expanding  export  and import
competing  sectors led to a revival  of private investment.  The simulations
presented  in  the  Solimano  paper  show  that  the  short-run  effect  of  devaluation  on
private investment  is negative  whereas the medium-term  effect is positive.
Solimano  also shows that uncertainty  matters in investment  decisions,  but
uncertainty  from  exchange  rate  variability  does  not  affect  investment.  Instead17
higher  uncertainty  due  to  output  variability  leads  to  delay  investment  decisions
given  the  irreversibility  of capital  outlays.
Chhibber  and  Shafik  (1990)  address  the  same  set  of  issues  for  Indonesia
with a larger  macroeconomic  model of the economy.  Their model allows for
endogenous  determination  of  investment,  consumption,  the  real  exchange  rate,  real
interest  rates  and  real  output. The  real  exchange  rate  has  a  negative  short-run
effect  on  private  investment  through  the  replacement  cost  of capital  as  well  as
the  cost  of imported  inputs. The  deviation  of the  real  exchange  rate  from  its
equilibrium  level  affects  the  level  of the  real interest  rate in the  economy.
The  domestic  real  interest  equals  the  foreign  interest  rate  plus  expectations  on
a real  depreciation.  A delay  in  adjusting  the  exchange  rates  to  its  equilibrium
level  leads to expectations  of a devaluation,  capital flight  and a rise in
domestic  interest  rates. The  actual  devaluation  of  exchange  rates  lowers  these
expectations  and reduces  real  interest  rates.
Changes  in the real  exchange  rate  have a positive  impact  on exports
demand  in the model.  The model is used to examine the impact  of a slower
devaluation  in Indonesia.  The results  show that with a slower  devaluation,
private  investment  would have been higher in the short  run but lower in the
medium  term. An overvalued  exchange  rate  is  beneficial  only in  the short  run.
The  lower  growth  of  exports  due  to  the  overvaluation,  lowers  overall  growth  and
reduces  investment  in  the longer  run.
How  long  is the  long-run,  i.e.,  how  long  does  it take  for  devaluation
to produce  a positive  impact  on private  investment? In Chile  the turn-around
took  about  5  years  whereas  in Indonesia  it took  about  3  years.  In  both cases,
there  are  short-run  to  medium-run  costs  of  devaluation  which  had  to  be borne  in
order  to  reap  the  longer-run  benefits. It  is  interesting  to  speculate  on  why  the18
turn-around  came much sooner  in Indonesia,  in comparison  to Chile.  Both
countries  undertook fairly swift and drastic stabilization  and adjustment
policies. One  major difference,  was the  much higher  debt overhang  in Chile.
This  interpretation  is consistent  with Faini  and  de  Melo (1990)  who show for  a
cross-section  of countries  that  the resumption  of private  investment  has been
hampered  by countries  debt  service  burden.
The  empirical  evidence  from  Chile  and  Indonesia  suggest  that  a  part  of
decline  in  private  investment  is due  to the  transitional  costs  of adjusting  to
changed  relative  prices. Capital  is  not easily  mobile  between  sectors  and  the
shift  takes  place  gradually  through  depreciation  of capital  in  older/protected
industries  and  new investments  in  export-oriented  industries.
3.  FISCAL  RETRENCHMENTS,  PUBLIC INVESTMENT  PRIORITIES  AND PRIVATE  INVESTMENT
The  relationship  between  public  and  private  investment  is  often  posed
as competitive  or adversarial. This  masks  considerably  the  complexity  in the
interactions  between  public capital formation  and the profitability  of the
private  sector.  At a minimum,  it is necessary  to distinguish  within  public
investments  between those broadly classified  as  infrastructure  and  those
classified  as  non-infrastructure  activities.  The  former,  leaving  aside  for  the
moment  how it is financed,  is likely  to be  more complementary  than  competitive
with private  sector  profitability.  What  matters,  is  not just  the size  of the
public sector, but  how  effectively  it delivers services to  the private
sector.15
Section  2  posed  the  relationship  between  the  overall  size  of  the  fiscal
deficit  and  private  investment.  In  this  section  we ask  whether  the  way in  which19
public  expenditure  are cut is important? Are there  certain  types  of public
expenditures  which are complementary  to private investment  and should be
protected? First,  we look  at the theoretical  literature  and  then turn  to the
empirical  evidence  in developing  countries.
The issue  at hand is whether  investments  in projects  that provide
externalities  to the  private  sector  should  be accorded  a lower  social  discount
rate.  Ogura and Yohe  (1977) distinguish  between three types of public
expenditure:
(a) those that provide  direct  consumption  benefits  to the private
sector.
(b)  those  that  provide  services  that  are  direct  substitutes  for  goods
and  services  provided  by the  private  sector.
(c) those  that  are  complementary  to  private  investment.
They  argue  that  category  (a)  should  be discounted  at the  social  rate
of  time  preference;  category  (b)  by  the  marginal  rate  of  productivity  of  capital
to  the  private  sector  and  category  (c)  should  be discounted  at  a  rate  lower  than
either  (a)  or (c).  On the other  hand,  Harberger  (1972)  and Sandmo  and Dreze
(1971)  argue  that  the  social  discount  rate  is  unique  a..d  common  to  all  projects.
It  measures  the  cost  to  the  economy  when  resources  are  withdrawn  from  the  private
sector  by the  public. This  unique  social  rate  of  discount  should  be a  weighted
average  of  the  marginal  rate  of  productivity  of  capital  in  the  private  sector  and
the  social  rate  of  time  preference.  Therefore  public  projects  that  have  positive
externalities  should  incorporate  these  into  the  benefit  stream  in  the  course  of
project  evaluation  instead  of  using  different  discount  rates  for  different  types
of  projects.  Whichever  option  is  chosen  the  externalities  from  public  investment
in  projects  that  are  complementary  to private  investment  should  matter.20
Typically,  the  marginal  productivity  of  private  capital  will  be  greater
than  the  social  rate  of time  preference. This  suggests  that  in the  Ogura-Yohe
classification  the expenditure  cutting  priorities  should  be to first  cut (b)
those  public  investments  that  provide  services  that  are  direct  substitutes  for
goods  and  services  provided  by  the  private  sector  before  cutting  category  (a)  or
(c).  With this analytical  background,  let us now turn to the empirical
literature  in developing  countries  to see  what the evidence  indicates. 16 We
concentrate  on  the  few  studies  that  show  positive  complementarity  between  public
investment  and  private  investment.
3.1  Empirical  Evidence  of Complementarity
In  a  detailed  study  of  the  Nigerian  manufacturing  industry,  Lee  (1989),
has  shown  how  the  breakdown  of  social  infrastructure  has  forced  private  companies
in  Nigeria  to  acquire  costly  generators. The  study  shows  that  there  are  clear
economies  of scale . *  the provision  of utilities,  communications  and social
services  from  which private  producers  derive  enormous  benefits.  Their  non-
availability  due  to forced  reductions  in  public  investment  impose  heavy  costs,
and shift  resources  away from  productive  private  investment. Studies  in the
agricultural  sector  also  find  strong  evidence  of  a  very  sizeable  and  significant
impact  of public investment  in irrigation  on private  sector  output  response
(Chhibber,  1988,  Binswanger,  1988).
The  study  by Blejer  and  Khan (1984)  is  the  most  comprehensive  attempt
at  understanding  the  impact  of different  types  of public  investment  on private
investment.  This  study  confirms  the  hypothesis  that  infrastructural  investment
has  a  positive effect on private investment  whereas non-infrastructural
investment  has  a  negative  impact. The  results  of this  study  are  not conclusive21
because  in  the  absence  of  a  detailed  breakdown  of  public  investment,  the  authors
use  prozies  for  investment  in  infrastructure.  Blejer  and  Shan  use  two  different
proxies  for infrastructure  investments (1)  a proxy  based  on the  premise  that
infrastructure  investments  have  a long  gestation  period  and  therefore  the  trend
level  of total  public  investment  can  represent  infrastructure;  and (2)  a  proxy
that  posits  that  because  of its  long-term  nature,  infrastructure  investment  is
more likely  to be anticipated. However,  infrastructure  investment  is  usually
very lumpy. Therefore,  the  measure  based  on the  trend  level  of investment  may
be reflecting  other types  of investment  spending  that  are fairly  stable  over
time. Similarly,  expenditure  on  infrastructure  is  often  unexpected  since  it  can,
by its  nature,  be postponed  if  neglect  or deterioration  is tolerable. Also,
because  investment  in  infrastructure  in  developing  countries  is  often  associated
with  borrowed  resources  from  banks  or  donors,  there  is  likely  to  be  even  greater
uncertainty  in formulating  expectations  about  future  outlays. 17
A more direct  examination  of this issue is provided  in a paper on
Turkey  by  Chhibber  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1990). This  study  finds  strong  evidence
that  non-infrastructural  public  investment  hurts  private  investment  but  no  strong
evidence  to support  the  positive  impact  of public  infrastructure  investment  on
private investment. 18 These results support the decision of the Turkish
authorities  to  restructure  public  investment  away  from  manufacturing  and  mining.
The study  by Shafik (1990)  for Egypt,  finds strong  evidence  to suppor'.  the
positive  impact  of  public  infrastructural  investment  on  private  investment.  The
rebuilding  of  Egyptian  infrastructure  in  the  late  19708  and  early  1980s,  which
had  deteriorated  sharply  in  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s,  provided  support  for
the  recovery  in  private  investment.  Shafik,  surprisingly,  finds  no evidence  of
financial  crowding  out  of  private  investment.22
The  evidence  in  these  studies,  though  by  no  means  conclusive,  supports
the restructuring  of public investment  that is  occurring in a  number of
developing  countries. The  objective  of this  shift  is  to  protect  a set  of 'core
investments,  --  power,  transport,  telecommunications,  hospitals,  and schools.
Meanwhile,  public investments  in manufacturing  and mining enterprises  are
curtailed  and  in  many  cases  being  supplanted  by  private  activity.  In  some  cases,
e.g.,  in Ghana  and  Nigeria,  the  cuts in  public  investment  had  gone so far  that
they  begin  to hurt the "core"  sectors. These  need to  be restored  in order  to
take advantage of the complementarity  between public and private capital
formation.  In sum, the lessons of the recent past have shown that the
composition  of fiscal  expenditure  cuts  makes a difference  to the behavior  of
private  investors.
4.  TAX POLICY,  CAPITAL MA1RETS  AND  PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Reliance  on  tax  policy  to  influence  business  investment  spending  has
been  a  permanent  feature  of  public  policy  in  the  market  economy  of  the  industrial
countries  in  postwar  era.  In the  United  States,  for  instance,  there  have  been
important  tax  changes  in  1954,  1962,  1964,  1981  and  1986,  all  of  which  contained
provisions  for  investment  recovery. 19 Similarly,  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  tax
reforms  of 1950, 1952, 1958, 1964, 1965, and 1975 have entailed  important
revisions with  regard to  tax  treatment of  capital income, depreciation
allowances,  and tax credit  exemptions.  These frequent  changes  in the tax
system,  initiated  by the desire  to alter investment  spending,  have not been
confined  to these  two  countries. Indeed,  a review  of the experience  of other
countries  conjure  up  the  feeling  that,  as  Hall  and  Jorgenson  (:)67)  pointed  out,23
'The  effectiveness  of tax  policy  in  altering  investment  behavior  is an article
of faith  among  policymakers  and  economists."
In  contrast, tax policy has not  figured so prominentLy  in the
developing  countries'  programs  of  economic  stabilization  and  investment  control.
Relative  to  other  tools  of  economic  policy,  such  as  exchange  rate,  interest  rate,
and  commercial  policy,  governments  in  developing  countries  have  generally  shied
away  from  the  use  of  tax  devices  to  affect  indirectly  the  investment  behavior  of
the  private  sector. Instead,  the  basic  strategy  has  depended  on  a  mix of  direct
intervention  in  the  financial  and  foreign  exchange  markets  in  order  to influence
the  cost  and  availability  of capital  to the  private  sector  and  imposition  of a
tight  regulatory  framework  over investment  decision  making,  project  selection,
and  appraisal.  The  costs  of  resource  misallocation  associated  with  this  strategy
are by now  well known,  perhaps  most exemplified  in the  experience  of Eastern
European  countries,  but also in some developing  countries such as Zimbabwe
(Dailami  and  Walton  (1989]  and  Egypt (Dailami  and  Dinh (1990)]. The shift  in
economic  strategy  from  the  past  method  of  direct  government  intervention  to  a  new
strategy,  dependent  on policy-induced  incentives,  is  currently  a focus  of the
ongoing  liberalization  and  privatization  measures  undertaken  in  most  developing
countries. A well-designed  corporate  tax system  is an integral  ingredient  of
such  a  new strategy.
We now discuss  the incentive  effect  of capital  income  taxation  on
private  business  investment  in  the  financial  environment  of  developing  countries.
Diversity  in  tax  codes,  degree  of inflation  indexation,  ownership  structure  of
capital,  legal definition  of income,  extent  of capital  market imperfections
prevailing  in  the  developing  world,  force  us  to  consider  only  the  most  important
aspects of  the interactions  between taxes, inflation and  capital market24
imperfections  in developing  countries. 20 The discussion  is centered  around
two  basic  characteristics  of  developing  countries  that: (i)  nominal  rather  than
real income  serves  as the  basis for  both individual  and  business  taxation  of
income  from  capital;Z1  and (ii)  capital  markets  are  imperfect.
4.1  Capital  Market  Imperfections
Recognizing the  role  of  capital market  imperfections  in  the
relationship  between  tax  policy  and  business  investment  behavior  represents  only
half of the story.  The other  half, involves  identifying  key aspects  of such
imperfections  that  bear  upon  the  financing  and  investment  decisions  of firms  on
one hand,  and the savings  and asset  portfolio  allocation  of investors  on the
other. To that  end,  it is useful  to  begin  with the simplest  case  of a perfect
capital  market  condition,  which  underlies  the  Modigliani-Miller  (1963)  theorem,
or  the  Jorgenson  investment  model  (1963).  Under  those  conditions,  the  firm  faces
a perfectly  elastic  supply  of  capital,  and  the  tax  system  is  simplified  to  only
a  proportional  tax  on  corporate  income  with  deductible  interest  expenses. It is
not  difficult  to see  that,  in this  setting  the  firm  should,  in  principle,  rely
entirely  on debt  to finance  its  investment,  and, furthermore,  that  the  primary
channel  through  which tax policy  can affect  business  investment  spending  is
variation  in the  cost  of capital  (Hall  and  Jorgenson  (1969,  1971)1.22
The  fact  that  firms  in practice  draw  on both  debt  and  equity  to fund
their  investment  and  growth  has  been a source  of considerable  debate  about  the
determinants  of corporate  capital  structure  in the field  of corporate  finance
(see  Gordon  and  Malkiel  (1981);  Kim  (1982)  for  survey  of  literature.]  The  debate
has, however, centered almost exclusively  around the experience  of a  few
industrial  countries,  namely,  the  U.S. and  the  U.K.,  where  capital  markets  are25
assumed  to be perfect,  where there is separate  treatment  of corporate  and
personal  income,  and  where  debt  is  treated  more  favorably  than  equity. Thus,  in
the  case of corporate  taxes  in the  U.S.,  distributions  to debt securities  are
generally  deductible  against  corporate  income,  whereas  distributions  against
equity  claims  are  not.  The advantage  this  gives  to debt  may be partially,  or
under  some  circumstances  totally,  offset  by  the  higher  taxation  of  debt  relative
to  equity at  the personal level  (Miller (1977)].  Within the  framework
established  by this  body of literature,  optimal  corporate  financing  decisions
involve  balancing  the  net tax  benefits  of borrowings,  taking  into  account  both
corporate  and  personal  taxation,  against  various  leverage-related  costs,  such  as
bankruptcy  costs,  due  to  agency  and  asymmetric  information  problems  or a  loss  of
non-debt  tax shields.  (See  DeAngelo  and  Masulis  (1980),  Kim (1982),  and Ross
(1985)]. Depending  on the significance  and  magnitude  of these  costs and the
relevant  tax  parameters,  an  optimal  corporate  capital  structure  (at  the  firm  or
the  aggregate  level)  can  be  derived  and  used  as  a  basis  for  analyzing  the  impact
on  firms'  financing  decisions  of  changes  in  tax  structures,  [see  Bradley,  Jarrell
and  Kim (1984);  and  Titman  and  Wessels  (1988)  for  empirical  results].
While  there  are  important  similarities  in  the  prevailing  tax  codes  in
the  developing  countries  and  the  U.S.  in terms  of  corporate  taxation,  there  are
important  differences  in  personal  taxation. One  such  difference,  for  example,
is  the  much  lighter  taxation  of  interest  income  relative  to  equity  income  in  most
developing  countries  relative  to that  in the  U.S.  Indeed,  in most developing
countries,  interest  incomes  are  either  tax  exempt  or  are  treated  more  favorably.
In  Egypt,  for  instance,  interest  incomes  on  bank  deposits  with  maturity  less  than
two  years  are tax  exempt. Also, in Korea,  thanks  to various  exemptions,  the
effective  maximum  tax  rate  on interest  income  (including  defense,  education  and26
residence  taxes)  is  18  percent  compared  to  28  percent  in  the  United  States  (after
the  tax  reform  of 1986). But income  from  stocks  is taxed  much  more  heavily  in
Korea; although  capital gains are not subject to personal taxation  there,
dividend  income  is  taxed  at  a  rate  as  high  as  70  percent  for  wealthy  individuals,
once  the  defense  and  residence  taxes  are  taken  into  account.
To  gain  a  quantitative  perspective  of the  implications  on  the  cost  of
funds  to corporations  of differential  taxation  of income  from  capital,  Table  2
draws  on estimate  of tax  rates  for  the  Korean  economy  in 1986  to calculate  the
after  tax  return  to  investors  of distribution  of  one  unit  of corporate  earning.
Thus,  given  an average  effective  corporate  income  tax  rate of 29.6 percent  in
1986,23 the after-tax return to investors is seen from Table 2  to vary
considerably, ranging from 0.95 --  if it  were distributed as interest  payment --
to 0.21  percent  if it  were  distributed  as dividend  income  to individuals  at  the
high  tax  bracket. Corresponding  to  such  wide  variation  in  after  tax  returns  on
corporate  earnings  is  the  large  differential  in  the  cost  of  funds  associated  with
firms'  various  forms  af finance. Thus,  as far as taxes  are concerned,  these
estimates  imply  a hierarchical  fi.iancing  order,  in which firms  rely on debt
first,  then  on retained  earnings,  and  finally,  as a last  resort,  on issuing  new
shares  in the stock  market.  It is however,  important  to note that such a
financing  order  depends  singularly  on  the  specific  configuration  of  the  tax  rates
in  the  Korean  economy.24 To the  extent  that  it  can  be generalized  to encompass
the  form  of business  finance  in  other  countries  depends  on the  following  set  of
inequalitiest
(l-mn)  C1-0)  (l-c)  (1-  )O  s(-e)  (3)
where  all  symbols  are  defined  in  Table  2.27
Table  2:  Capital  Income  Taxation  and  Fome8  of Finance:
Evidence  from  Korea
After-tax  return  on one  unit  of capital  earning  distributed  ass
1.  Interest  payments  M - )  0X-  O
(borrowing)  0.95
2.  Capital  gains  (1-a)tl--)  0.704
(retained  earnings)
3.  Dividend  payments
(share  issues)
(a)  Individuals  (M-m1)(1-1)  0.21
(b)  Corporations  0.429
C1-m*)  C1-s')
where  'r  - average  effective  corporate  income  tax  rate;
T  =  statutory  corporate  income  tax rate;
t  - personal  tax  rate  on interest  income;
c  - personal  tax  rate  on  capital  gains
mi  - personal  marginal  tax  rate  on dividend  income;  and
mc  - corporate  tax  rate  on dividend  income.28
Furthermore,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  capital  gains  in  most  developing
countries  are  exempt  from  taxation,  the  condition  for  debt  to be the  preferred
source  of company  finance  is simply  seen  from  equation  (3)  that r  >  t, or,  in
other  words, the corporate  income  tax rate exceeds  the tax rate on interest
income  --  a condition  that  seems  applicable  to  many developing  countries.
Such  an incentive  towards  debt financing  generated  by the  tax system
is,  moreover,  strongly  reinforced  by governments'  pervasive  intervention  in  the
financial system.25  Interventions  such as directed credit allocation to
favored  sectors  or firms  through  subsidized  interest  rates,  artificial  ceiling
on  rates,  and  bailouts  of  corporations  in  financial  difficulties  have  generally
resulted  in keeping  the before-tax  cost of debt artificially  low.  The tax
deductibility  of nominal  interest  expenses  at the  corporate  level  has usually
reinforced  this advantage,  particularly  in inflationary  environments.  This
explains,  to a considerable  degree,  the  reason  why corporations  in developing
countries  are so much more leveraged  than their counterparts  in the United
States.  or even  Japan. 26 This  also  explains  the  low  efficiency  of investment
evident  in  many developing  countries.  As an  illustrative  example,  consider  the
results  reported  in Table  3 which show  in the  case of Egypt  how a  standard"
project yielding  a  low real return of even 4 percent per annum would be
acceptable  under  the  prevailing  tax,  depreciation,  Interest  rate  and inflation
conditions  in  that  country. Such  conditions  are  furthermore  representative  of
many  other  developing  countries. The  implications  are resource  misallocations
and  investment  inefficiency.29
Table  3:  Real  Return  on a  Standard  Project
A.  Parameters
(1)  Nominal  rate  of interest  6.161
(average  1980-89)
(2)  Rate of inflation  16.242
(average  1980-89)
(3)  Corporate  income  tax rate  401
(4)  Rate of  economic  depreciation  8t
(5)  Depreciation  schedule,  352  the  first  year
of operations  and  straight  line  101  per
year thereafter.
(6)  Life-time  of  project  10 years  with a scrap
value  of  25Z  of  initial
investment  at  the  end  of
the  ten  years
B.  The  Result
Real return  on investment  -3.9Z
5.  INFLATION,  TAXES AND INVISTHMENT
In the absence  of a fully indexed  tax system,  inflation  affects  the
incentive  to invest  in  fixed  assets  in  a  variety  of  ways. Even  abstracting  from
its impact on companies'  gross return to capital,  there are two important
channels  through,  which  inflation  could  affect  the  after-tax  return  to investors,
both  creditor  and  shareholders.  First,  the  prevailing  accounting  procedure  for
determining  capital  consumption  allowances  may  fail  to  reflect  fully  the  impact
on  the  real  value  of  depreciable  assets  of  inflation.  Under  the  historical  cost
depreciation  system,  which is the most common among developing  countries,
accounting  depreciation  allowances  are  poor estimates  for the  market  value  of
capital  used  up during  the  production  process. As a result,  taxable  income  is
overstated,  which imparts  an upward  bias in the  effective  tax rate  on income30
derived  from  fixed  assets. Furthermore,  this  downward  bias  increases  with the
rate of inflation  and is basically  a function  of the share  of depreciable  to
total  assets.
Second,  inflation  can  lead  to a lower  effective  tax  rate  because  of tax
deductibility  of business  interest  payments. Given  this  provision,  inflation
lowers  the real cost of debt to corporate  borrowers  because in inflationary
environments,  interest  payments  are partly payments  of principal (see,  for
example,  Cohn and  Modigliani  (1985)). Treating  the  inflationary  component  of
interest  payments,  which is, in effect,  a capital  expenditure,  as a current
expense  for  tax  purposes  confers  a subsidy  in the  form  of tax  savings  to  equity
holders.  This  subsidy  is fundamentally  a function  of two  variables:  (i)  the
corporation's  leverage ratio, i.e. its debt-to-asset  ratio; and  (ii) the
prevailing  rate  of  inflation.  Therefore,  the  higher  the  rate  of  inflation  or  the
higher  the  firm's  leverage  ratio,  the  higher  the  value  of  this tax  savings  and
thus,  the  lower  the  real  cost  of debt.
In determining  the real cost of debt to the corporate sector, the
inflation  tax  shield  is  of particular  importance  in  developing  countries  where
corporations  rely  heavily  on debt capital  particularly  bank loans  to finance
their  investment. And that is more so in high inflation  countries  of Latin
America.  In the case of Colombia,  for instance,  Dailami (1989)  shows  that
without  inflation  tax  shield,  the  average  real  cost  of  borrowing  from  financial
institutions  during  1980-1985  period  would  have  been  13.25  percent  instead  of  3.7
percent.27  In other  words, in the absence  of the inflation  tax shield,  the
real  cost  of debt  would  have  been  prohibitively  high:  only  highly  profitable
firms,  i.e. those  with real rate  of return  on capital  exceeding  13.25  percent
could  have  been  able  to invest  in fixed  assets.31
The  cost  of  debt  is,  of  course,  only  one  component  of the  overall  cost  of
capital,  which is the  relevant  factor  for  business  investment  decisions. For
investment  in  fixed  assets,  i.e.  plant,  machinery,  and  equipment,  the  other  main
components  of  the  cost  of  capital  are: cost  of  equity,  the  acquisition  price  of
capital,  taxation,  depreciation  allowances,  and the  cost of asset  decay.  The
analysis  of  how these  factors  may interact  with inflation  to  influence  the  real
cost  of capital  is  not, however,  straightforward  in the  context  of developing
countries. While  inflation  leads  generally  to decrease  the  real  cost  of debt,
as  argued  above,  it  also  has  some  offsetting  effects  through  its  influence  on  the
real  cost  of equity,  the  acquisition  price  of capital  goods  and  the real  value
of  depreciation  allowances.  To  what  extent  then,  inflation  may  affect  the  cost
of capital  and  thereby  investment  is an  empirical  question.
As a more direct  examination  of the implications  on firms'  investment
behavior  of  the  interaction  between  taxes  and  inflation,  Dailami,  (1990),  focuses
on the  experience  of Korea,  and examines,  firms'  investment  responses  to the
significant  lowering  of  inflation  in  the  early  1980s.  Drawing  on  individual  firm
data, Dailami compares  the investment  behavior of a  sample of 251 public
corporations  listed  in the  Korean  stock  exchange  during  two  periodst  ti)  the
high  inflation  of  1981-1982,  and  (ii)  the  low  inflation  of 1983-87,  and  advances
the  hypotheses  that  firms'  investment  behavior  during  the  low  inflation  period,
(1983-1987)  should  be  negatively  related  to their  initial  leverage  ratios  (i.e.
1981-1982). The argument  being that,  the significant  decline  in the rate  of
inflation  from  an  annual  average  of  14.2  percent  during  1981-1982  period,  to  3.7
percent  in  1983-87  period  should  have led  to increase  firms'  real  cost  of debt
capital and such an increase  should  be proportional  to the firms' initial
leverage  ratios.  In other words, firms that were initially  more irndbted32
relative  to  others  should  have  experienced  a  higher  increase  in their  cost  of
capital  and  should  have  been  subsequently  more  severely  affected,  as  they  had  to
bear a higher real cost of debt service  payments.  Using a cross-sectional
analysis,  Dailami  finds  strong  empirical  evidence  supporting  his hypothesis,
thereby establishing  an important  empirical link between firms' degree of
indebtedness  and their investment  responses  to the stabilization  measures  of
early 19809.28  Furthermore,  such a link is important  in understanding  the
widely observed episodes of  economic slowdown  or  recession which  follow
stabilization  measures  in  most  developing  countries. It is,  however,  important
to note that the link uncovered  here between  investment  and disinflation  is
through  the  cost  of  capital  effect  rather  than  through  the  demand,  or  multiplier,
effect  which  has been  often  emphasized  in the  literature.  It,  therefore  calls
for  greater  attention  to  be paid to the  financial  position  of the  companies  in
the  design  and  implementation  of stabilization  measures.
6.  CONCLUSION
This  paper  has  shown  the  central  role  of fiscal  policy  in  determining  the
size of private  investment. Since  most developing  countries  have restricted
access  to foreign  financing,  there  is  direct  competition  between  the  public  and
private  sector  for  limited  financial  resources. High fiscal  deficits  pre-empt
these  for the public  sector  and exclude  the  private  sector  from them.  In a
regime  of rationed  credit  smaller  firms  get  hurt  more  than  the  larger  ones. The
manner  in  which  expenditure cuts are  made  also matters.  Expenditure
restructuring  is necessary  to protect  and in some cases even expand  public
investments  which are complementary  to the private  sector. More importantly33
expenditure  restructuring  is  necessary  in  order  to avoid  physical  crowding  out
of private  firms  from  product  and  factor  markets.
With reduced  fiscal  deficits  and  financial  liberalization,  market  forces
will  play  a larger  role  in  the  volume  and  allocation  of  private  investment.  Tax
policy  will  play  an increasingly  important  role  in  influencing  market  investment
decisions.  This requires,  per force,  a better understanding  and a greater
appreciation  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  various  institutional,  financial  and  tax
factors  which have led to such a high degree  of corporate indebtedness  in
developing  countries. These  factors  have  included: (i)  a  tax  system  which  has
generally  favored  debt to equity  both at corporate  and personal  level; (ii)
inadequate  accounting  for inflation  in calculation  of net corporate  income,
particularly  due to poor adjustment  for depreciation  allowances,  and (iii)
governments'  interest  rate and direct  credit  allocation  policies  which have
relied  on banking  system  to further  their industrialization  and development
objectives.  This  paper  has  highlighted  the  main elements  of these  factors  that
must  be incorporated  in  determining  the  cost  of  capital  to firms,  and  the  after-
tax  rate  of return  to investors.
While this  paper  has pointed  to rethinking  in several  policy  areas  of
vital  importance  for  the revival  of private  investment,  other important  areas
which  we have not discussed  much are deregulation  and  privatisation  of public
enterprises. Deregulation  includes  the removal  of a vast array of controls,
permits  and licensing  procedures  common  to many developing  countries;  often
leading  legitimate  private  business  into  the underground  or parallel
economy. 29 While  entrepreneurs  can thrive  in the parallel  economy  there  are34
limits.  The 'illegality'  of the  parallel  economy  and the constant  threat  of
state  reprisal  are  not conducive  to  consolidated  capital  accumulation.
Although ongoing reforms clear the path for a  revival of private
investment,  the  debt  overhang  remains  an  obstacle. High  debt  service  ratios  are
a signal  to both domestic  and foreign  investors  of the likelihood  of policy
reversals. Countries,  even  ones  which  have  undergone  thorough  reforms,  remain
very vulnerable  to external  shocks  even possibly  temporary  ones such as the
recent  oil price  hikes.  The  need to service  large  debt  burdens  enhances  this
vulnerability  and  makes  private  investors  shy  away  from  long-term  'irreversible'
investments  because  of their  fear  that  policy  changes  will not  be sustained.35
ZDNOTES
1.  In  economies  in  which interest  rates  are  unregulated  and  credit  is
not  allocated the relevant variable is real interest rates.  In
financially  repressed  economies  the  share  of  credit  going  to  the  private
sector  is  the relevant  va;iable.
2.  For a more detailed  discussion  see Buiter (1988),  Anand and van
WiJnbergen  (1989)  and  Easterly  (1989).
3. The  empirical  literature  on the  effect  of interest  rates  on private
savings  is  v..st  and  inconclusive.
4. Assuming  basically  closed  capital  markets  or  at least  markets  where
for  a number  of reasons  foreign  financing  was  not a realistic  option.
5.  See  van Wijnbergen  (1983)  and Dailami (1988)  for elaboration  and
further  detail.
6.  Sharrif's  curiously  used both the fiscal  deficit and a credit
variable  in  his  equations  although  the  two  would  be inter-related.
7.  An important  caveat  here is that none of these  studies  test for
causality.  Intuitively,  it is unlikely  that the causality  goes the
other  way,  i.e.  from  private  investment  to  credit  to  the  private  sector.
8.  A compensating  balance  is the  share  of a loan  held in  deposit  by a
commercial  bank. The  effective  lending  rate  is  then (rL  - rd . b)l(l  -
b), where r  is the nominal  lending  rate,  rd is the nominal  deposit
rate,  and  b is the  compensating  balance.
9. The  compensating  balances  were  calculated  from  the  balance  sheets  of
the  commercial  banks.
10.  Assuming  insignificant  foreign  financing  for  the  private  sector.
11. We have  avoided  here  the  more  interesting  but less  tractable  issue
of whether the public  sector  should  have borne the entire  burden  of
adjustment.  In  countries  where  the  private  sector  had  benefitted  in  the
phase of fiscal  expansion,  and had secured  foreign  financing  through
government  guarantees,  it should  have borne part of the subsequent
adjustment.  The problem  was that the beneficiaries  of the earlier
expansion  were  not the  ones  who paid  for  the subsequent  retrenchment.
12.  See  Krugman  and Taylor  (1978)  and  a recent  survey  in Lizondo  and
Montiel  (1989).
13.  Some ascribe a  negative effect of  stabilization  on private
investment  can  also arise  from  the increased  uncertainty  about  policy
changes  once  the  government  embarks  on a  program. The  opposite  is  also
possible if  the  inception of  a  reform program signals that the36
government  is  willing  to take  action,  then  uncertainty  can be reduced
and  credibility  enhanced.
14.  Assuming  no effect  of a devaluation  on  private  consumption.
15.  There  can  be  much  higher  benefits  to the  private  sector  if public
expenditure  on  maintenance  improves  the  efficiency  of  say,  power  plants
or roads  --  instead  of adding  more of them.
16.  At the  outset  it is important  to  point  that  there  are  a  number  of
studies  which  show  very  negative  effects  from  the  public  sector  to the
economy. Balassa  (1989)  using  cross-country  econometric  results  shows
a very negative  relationship  between public  and private investment.
Khan  and  Reinhart  (1990)  estimate  a  cross-country  growth  equation  for  24
countries  which  includes  public  and  private  inve,stment  separately.  The
results  indicate  that public  investment  has no effect  on growth. One
interpretation  of their  result  could  be that public  investment  has no
direct  growth  effect  but  only improves  the  marginal  rate  of return  to
private  capital. There  could  also  be strong  multi-collinearity  between
public  and  private  investment  which  they  do  not correct  for.
17.  There  may  also  be  common  trends  in  the  economy. As  GNP rises,  both
public  and  private  investment  increase.
18.  Public  infrastructure  investment  includes  investments  in power,
telecommunication,  transport,  health  and  education.
19.  For  detailed  analysis  of these  tax  changes  and  their  implications
for  business  investment  in  the  U.S.  see  Brown  (1955);  Chase  (1962),  Hall
and  Jorgenson  (1967  and  1971);  Bosworth  (1985).
20.  The issue  of equity  is  covered  by Cornia  and  Stewart's  study  and
tax  neutrality  as well as other  proposals  to reform  tax structures  in
developing  countries,  are covered  by Thirsk's  study  included  in this
volume.
21.  The Israeli tax reform  of 1982, provide an important  case of
adapting  to an inflation-adjusted  income  tax system.  (See  Bronfeld  and
Swary  (1985)  for  details.]
22.  Within  this  context,  attention  has traditionally  been focused  on
the implications  of the  cost of capital  changes  in the investment  tax
credit  or depreciation  rules  (Hall  and  Jorgenson  (1967,  1969);  Bradford
(1980);  Auerbach  and  Jorgenson  (1980)]. In  that  sense,  the  interaction
between  taxes  and  cost  of  funds,  i.e.,  interest  rate  and  cost  of  equity,
has  been ignored.
23.  This is estimated  by  taking a  weighted average of observed
effective  tax  rates  of  251  non-financial  public  companies  listed  in  the
Korea Stock  Exchange  in 1986.  Figure 3 in the Appendix shows the
distribution  of the  effective  tax  rate  across  the  firms  in the  sample.
It thus can  be seen  that about  19Z  of companies  in that year paid no37
corporate  income  tax,  and  the  majority  of them  paid taxes  close  to the
statutory  tax  rate  of 39.6.
24.  Note that  this  particular  financial  hierarchy,  as implied  by the
Korean tax code, is different  from the traditional  "pecking  ordar"
[Donaldson  (1961);  Myers  (1985)],  where  retained  earnings  are  preferred
to risky  debt,  which are, in turn,  new share issues.  One plausible
explanation  is that  the  risk  of debt  financing  to the  corporate  sector
is significantly  reduced  in the developing  countries  through  various
implicit  or explicit  government  guarantee scheme and the frequent
bailout  of companies  in financial  distress.
25. The  pervasive  nature  of  governments'  interventions  in  the  financial
systems  of  developing  countries  has,  of  course,  been  well recognized  and
documented  (see,  in particular,  the 1989 World Development  Report).
Following  the  classic  work of McKinnon  (1973)  and Shaw (1973)  a large
body of literature  has evolved,  highlighting  the  nature  and  extent  of
such  interventions,  particularly in  the  form of  directed credit
allocation  and controlled  interest  rates and their implications  for
growth,  investment  and efficiency. Thus,  Bruno (1979),  Buffie (1984)
and  van  Wijnbergen  (1983)  develop  macro  models  of financial  repression;
Gelb  (1989) provides  a  cross-country study  of  the  aggregate
relationships  between real interest rates, investment,  growth and
efficiency  for a sample of large developing  countries;  and Dailami
(1988)  analyzes  the impact  of interest  rate  controls  on corporate  real
investment  in  Korea.
26.  Estimates  provided  by Kim (1989a),  for instance,  show that the
average  equity  ratio  for  Korean  listed  corporations  during  1977-1986  is
about 16 percent,  compared  to corresponding  values of 40 percent  for
Japanese  corporations,  and  50  percent  for  U.S.  corporations.
27.  It needs  also to  be noted  that  the inflation  tax shield  has been
very important  in encouraging  corporations  in developing  countries  to
rely  so  heavily  on debt  capital. Concern  with high corporate  leverage
has  motivated  some  governments  to eliminate  or gradually  phase  out  the
tax deductibility  of the inflationary  component  of interest  payments.
Under  the  Colombian  Tax  Reform  of 1986,  for  instance,  the inflationary
component  of business  interest  payments  will be gradually  phased  out,
such  that  by 1996  only real  interest  payments  will be eligible  for tax
deduction  (see  Dailami  (1989)  for  details).
28. Furthermore,  Dailami  finds  that  the  correlation  coefficient  between
firms investment  ratios  (i.e.  the ratio  of fixed  investment  to total
assets) in the  low  and high inflation periods was  negative and
statistically  significant.  Such  finding  is suggestive  of an important
degree  of shift  in the investment  behavior  of firms in Korea as the
result  of the  disinflation  of early  1980s.38
29.  For  empirical  evidence  on the costs  of regulation  in Peru see  de
Soto  (1990). Similar  evidence,  though  of  a  more  anecdotal  nature  can  be
found in many other  countries,  see for instance,  Dailami,  and Walton
(1989),  for  the  case  of Zimbabwe.Figure  3
Firm  Distribution  According  to  Observed  Effective  Corporate  Tax  Rate  in 1986
(Sample  of 251  Korean  Companies)
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